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ARTICLES
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
ALLOWING JURIES TO INTERPRET THE
LAW ARE NOT AS CRAZY AS THEY SOUND
MARCUS ALEXANDER GADSON†
INTRODUCTION
Today, just about everyone in the legal profession takes for
granted that judges should interpret the law and juries should
only determine facts. That attitude would have surprised many
colonists who settled in the New World as well as citizens in the
new republic after independence. In several colonies, juries had
the right not just to decide factual disputes, but to interpret the
law in criminal cases. After the founding, many states codified
the right of juries to resolve legal questions—a right retained for
much of the nineteenth century.
Slowly but surely, this right was eroded. Today, only three
states—Maryland, Georgia, and Indiana—have constitutional
provisions recognizing juries’ right to interpret the law in
criminal cases. Maryland and Georgia courts have nullified the
provisions, while Indiana has applied it, albeit narrowly. A
consensus has developed that professionally trained judges with
legal expertise are better suited to interpret the law than lay
jurors. Unsurprisingly, modern lawyers, commentators, and
judges have taken for granted that state constitutional provisions
such as Indiana’s, Maryland’s, and Georgia’s are “outmoded
relic[s]”1 that no longer belong in a modern justice system. These
provisions have been described as “ridiculous,” “absurd,” and
“comical.”2

†
The author thanks the editors of the St. John’s Law Review, Michael Klarman,
Nicole Garnett, Susannah Barton-Tobin, Carol Steiker, and Fredrik Bergman for
their assistance on this project at various stages.
1
Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 556 (1957).
2
James J. Robinson, Proposals for the Improvement of the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Indiana, 2 IND. L.J. 217, 224 n.13 (1926).
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This Article questions that consensus. Joining a larger
debate about the jury’s proper role, it argues that, even today,
these provisions are a defensible component of a criminal justice
system. First, this Article argues that the jury is the entity in
the justice system most incentivized to approach legal questions
with an eye to what the best interpretation is and not the most
politically palatable result. Second, this Article argues that the
jury’s ability to deliberate and consider opinions from individuals
hailing from a wider variety of backgrounds than those who
typically become judges may provide advantages over a single
trial court judge in interpreting the law. Third, it acknowledges
practical difficulties that allowing juries to interpret the law
could cause, but argues that they are not so insurmountable as to
make it unreasonable for state constitutional provisions like
Indiana’s, Maryland’s, and Georgia’s to allow juries to interpret
the law. Finally, this Article contemplates ways such provisions
could dramatically change plea bargaining.
I.
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

History in England

America’s jury system originated in England. So, English
history offers valuable insights into how American juries came to
acquire the power to resolve legal questions.
The consensus view from England was traditionally that
juries could only determine factual issues.3 William Blackstone
argued that jurors were “the best investigators of truth,” but
should not determine issues of law, since “if the power of
judicature were placed at random in the hands of the multitude,
their decisions would be wild and capricious, and a new rule of
action would be every day established in our courts.”4 There was
a minority view. During the 1600s, the Levellers advocated
giving the jury a greater role in the legal system and allowing it
to interpret the law.5 To Levellers, law “was a form of divine
command comprehensible and accessible to the common man.”6

3
Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 415 (1996).
4
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379–80; see also Smith, supra note
1, at 415.
5
THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200–1800, at 153 (1985).
6
Id. at 165.
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That is to say, ordinary jurors were just as capable as judges of
interpreting the law. In some ways, the Puritans who settled in
the New World held similar views towards religion. Puritans
believed in a “priesthood of all believers” and that laymen had a
responsibility to study the scriptures on their own rather than
simply relying on a minister’s teaching.7
This attitude found expression in John Lilburne’s 1649 trial
for high treason. Lilburne allegedly “maliciously, advisedly, and
traiterously did plot, contrive and endeavour to stir up, and to
raise force” against the Crown.8 As evidence against him, the
government quoted his writings.9 Denied a lawyer, Lilburne
asked to address the jury about matters of law.10 Lord Keble
replied, “[T]he jury are judges of matters of fact altogether, and
Judge Coke says so: But I tell you the opinion of the Court, they
are not judges of matter of law.”11 Lilburne responded, “The jury
by law are not only judges of fact, but of law also: and you that
call yourselves judges of the law, are no more but Norman
intruders; and in deed and in truth, if the jury please, are no
more but ciphers, to pronounce their verdict.”12 The jury
acquitted Lilburne in under an hour and celebrations erupted.13
A medal was even made to honor the jury, reading “John
Lilburne, saved by the power of the Lord and the integrity of his
jury, who are judge of law as well as fact.”14
This would not be Lilburne’s last brush with the law or the
last time he would argue that jurors were not only judges of fact.
At a 1653 trial on a charge of violating his order of banishment,
Lilburne argued that the parliamentary statute authorizing his
banishment was contrary to fundamental English law, that is, it
was unconstitutional.15 In the 1653 trial, the jury appears to
have accepted Lilburne’s argument that it could interpret the law
as well as determine the facts. Although the court instructed
jurors that they were judges of fact only, one juror said the jury

7
See Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 252–53
(1983).
8
Green, supra note 5, at 171.
9
Id. at 172.
10
Id. at 173.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 175–76.
14
Id. at 176.
15
Id. at 192–93.
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was convinced to acquit by what they heard out of a law book.16
Interestingly, although the United States Supreme Court cited a
1637 case of Lilburne’s where he argued for a fundamental right
to not have to answer questions concerning oneself in a criminal
case as evidence of the original understanding of the Fifth
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination,17 it has not
looked to Lilburne’s treason or banishment cases to understand
the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
B.

Juries Acquire the Power to Resolve Legal Questions in the
New World

In at least some colonies—especially in New England—juries
could determine legal issues before independence. Jurors in
Massachusetts were permitted to ignore judges’ views of the law
when they gave them,18 though perhaps for practical reasons as
well as ideological ones. At least three judges often sat at the
same time.19
Unsurprisingly, panels of multiple judges
sometimes had conflicting views on the law,20 which would have
made giving coherent instructions difficult. Jurors would then
have to decide whose view of the law to apply.21 Regardless,
jurors’ rights to determine legal issues evidently became so
engrained in Massachusetts that, on the eve of the American
Revolution, John Adams called it “an Absurdity to suppose that
the Law would oblige jurors to find a Verdict according to the
Direction of the Court, against their own Opinion, Judgment, and
Conscience.”22
New York juries also had the right to determine legal issues.
In criminal cases, lawyers could argue the law to the jury, and
jurors could ask questions about the law.23 A few cases are
instructive. In a 1702 treason case, one of the lawyers argued in
his closing statement that jurors were judges of the law and that
they had to resolve a legal question to decide the case.24
16

Id. at 197.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458–59 (1966).
18
Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 904 (1994).
19
Id. at 904–05.
20
Id. at 905.
21
See id.
22
Id. at 906.
23
Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine
the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 175, 177 (1988).
24
Id. at 179 (citing Dom. Rex v. Bayard, 14 Howell’s St. Trials 471, 504 (1702)).
17
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According to the lawyer’s report on the case, neither the judge
nor the prosecutor challenged him.25 In a 1707 case, Francis
Makemie went on trial for preaching without a license; he had
preached in some of New York’s dissenting churches.26 Only
legal issues were disputed in the case.27 The questions were
about the applicability of parliamentary acts in the New World
and “the extent of religious liberty in New York.”28 The Attorney
General asked for a special verdict: “[T]he matter of fact is
plainly confessed by the Defendant, as you have heard, . . . [and]
you are not Judges of Law.”29
Chief Justice Mompesson
disagreed. He told the jury that it had the authority to decide
legal questions and even admitted that he did not have the
answers to the legal issues raised in the case, stating that “[t]his
is the first Instance I can learn, has been of a Tryal or
Prosecution of this nature in America.”30
The best known case in New York—and likely the rest of the
country—was the famous 1735 case of John Zenger. Zenger was
charged with libel for publishing an article criticizing New York’s
governor.31 At trial, Chief Justice De Lancey excluded evidence
that the article was true on the ground that truth was not a
defense to libel under English law.32 Instead, he stated that the
jury could only decide if “Zenger printed and published [the]
papers.”33 However, Zenger’s attorney responded, “I do likewise
know they may do otherwise. I know they have the right beyond
all dispute to determine both the law and the fact, and where
they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so.”34 At least
according to the defense’s retelling of the trial—which no one has
challenged—Chief Justice De Lancey relented and conceded in

25

Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 181.
27
Id. at 181–82.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 182 (quoting FRANCIS MAKEMIE, A NARRATIVE OF A NEW AND UNUSUAL
AMERICAN IMPRISONMENT, OF TWO PRESBYTERIAN MINISTERS, AND PROSECUTION OF
MR. FRANCIS MAKEMIE ONE OF THEM, FOR PREACHING ONE SERMON AT THE CITY OF
NEW YORK (1707) (Evans #1300) (ellipsis and alteration in original).
30
Id. at 182–83.
31
Id. at 183–84.
32
Id. at 184.
33
Id. (quoting JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL
OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 78 (Stanley
Nider Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972)) (alteration in original).
34
Id.
26
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his final instructions that the jury could decide the legal issue of
whether truth was a defense to libel.35 It did.36
Juries in Rhode Island had the power to interpret the law,
too.37 A nineteenth-century commentator said that from the
beginning of the colony, Rhode Island judges sat “not for the
purpose of deciding causes, for the Jury decided all questions of
law and fact; but merely to preserve order, and to see that the
parties had a fair chance with the Jury.”38 And in 1699,
Governor Bellomont explained to the Board of Trade that Rhode
Island judges “give no directions to the jury, nor sum up the
evidences to them, pointing unto the issue which they are to
try.”39 In fact, a trial on a charge of forcible entry in 1662
indicates that the jury was supposed to decide whether an
indictment was valid.40
That said, in some colonies, juries did not have the right to
answer legal questions. In others, the historical record is too thin
to say definitively.41
C.

After the American Revolution

At some point after independence, it was commonly accepted
that juries could determine legal issues. That becomes clear from
reviewing the records of some of the few jury trials conducted by
the Supreme Court and the attempted removal of Justice Chase.
In Georgia v. Brailsford, the Court considered whether
British creditors could recover debts from the American
Revolution.42 The Supreme Court held a jury trial because
“whenever a State is a party, the Supreme court has exclusive
jurisdiction of the suit; and her right cannot be effectually
35

Id. at 184–85.
JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN
PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 101 (Stanley Nider
Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972).
37
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV.
582, 591 (1939).
38
Krauss, supra note 23, at 191 (quoting Preface to I D. Chipman (Vt. 1824)).
39
Id. at 192 (quoting 3 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND, AND
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, IN NEW ENGLAND 387 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1858)).
40
Id. at 193.
41
See id. at 130–31 (finding little evidence about South Carolina juries’ lawfinding authority); id. at 131–32 (same as to Delaware juries); id. at 135–36 (finding
ambiguous evidence concerning North Carolina juries); id. at 138–45 (same as to
Georgia juries); id. at 146–60 (finding juries probably did not have the right to
determine the law in Maryland); id. at 160–67 (finding insufficient evidence
concerning New Jersey juries); id. at 169–74 (same as to Pennsylvania juries).
42
See generally 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 402 (1792).
36

2019]

STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

7

supported, by a voluntary appearance, before any other tribunal
of the Union.”43 At trial, Justice Jay instructed the jury that “[i]t
is presumed that juries are the best judges of the facts; it is, on
the other hand, presumable, that the court are the best judges of
the law” but that “[i]t must be observed, that by the same law,
which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you
have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of
both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in
controversy.”44 Justice Jay’s instruction suggests some hesitation
about allowing juries to resolve legal questions because he
intimated to the jury that it should follow the Court’s reading of
the law. It is significant that even a person with misgivings
about giving juries a law finding right felt compelled to concede
it.
This view was so entrenched that denying juries their right
to interpret the law almost led to Justice Samuel Chase’s
removal. One of the charges against him was that, while riding
circuit, he had tried “to wrest from the jury their indisputable
right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of the
law, as well as on the question of fact, involved in the verdict
they are required to give.”45 At issue was Justice Chase’s conduct
in three cases. First, in Thomas Cooper’s trial, Cooper was
charged with violating the Sedition Act for publishing a handbill
attacking President John Adams and accusing him of biasing the
judiciary against Democrats.46 At trial, Justice Chase instructed
the jury that it was to convict Cooper if any part of what Cooper
wrote was untrue.47 Second, Justice Chase presided at John
Fries’s trial for leading a group of men to intimidate tax
collectors.48
Fries’s counsel complained that Justice Chase
prevented him from introducing federal statutes into evidence
and from arguing for a different interpretation of treason to the
jury than Justice Chase had given.49 Finally, Justice Chase
conducted James Callender’s trial for treason.50 Callender had
43

Id. at 406.
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 907 (quoting Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794)).
45
Id. at 908.
46
Adam A. Perlin, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase: Redefining Judicial
Independence, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 725, 733 (2010).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 734.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 734–35.
44
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written a pamphlet, The Prospect Before Us, criticizing the
Federalist Party and advocating for Thomas Jefferson’s election
in 1800.51 Callender’s lawyers attempted to argue to the jury
that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional.52 Justice Chase
responded, “The judicial power of the United States is the only
proper and competent authority to decide whether any statute
made by Congress (or any of the State Legislatures) is contrary
to, or in violation of, the Federal Constitution.”53
In response to the charges against him, Justice Chase said
that he had only given “assistance” to juries about what the laws
meant, which suggests he felt that he had to acknowledge juries’
right to judge the law to survive impeachment.54 The Senate
acquitted him of the charges, and he remained on the bench.55
Nonetheless, his experience is telling. Those seeking to impeach
Justice Chase had to find charges that would resonate with
Congress and the American public. By alleging that Justice
Chase had denied juries their right to determine the law in
criminal cases, his opponents demonstrated that Americans in
the early republic may have taken the jury’s law finding power
for granted.56
In the aftermath, states clarified the jury’s role. By 1851, at
least fifteen states enshrined the jury’s right to interpret the law,
either by practice, constitutional provision, judicial decision, or
statute.57
In Massachusetts, for example, the legislature
declared in 1808 that juries had the right to judge both law and

51

Id. at 735.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 908–09.
55
Perlin, supra note 46, at 780.
56
But see id. at 772. One of Justice Chase’s defenders at his impeachment trial
argued the following: [The jury is]
bound by the general principle of law as declared by the court. Their duty,
and their sole duty, consists in applying it to the particular case. In this
sense, and in this alone, are they judges of the law as well as of the
fact. . . . [B]ut it has never been entered into the head of any man to
suppose that the jury in such a case has a right to declare that the statute
itself is not a law of the land–has been repealed, has expired, or does not
create any offence. All these are questions of law, which come within the
exclusive province of the court.
Id. (emphasis in original).
57
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 910.
52
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fact, and a state constitutional convention in 1820 rejected a
similar proposal because it would just “establish what was now
the law of the land.”58
D. Juries Lose Their Right to Determine the Law
Justice Story openly questioned whether juries could resolve
legal questions. Before deciding the merits in United States v.
Battiste, he answered the prisoner’s lawyer’s suggestion “that in
criminal cases, and especially in capital cases, the jury are the
judges of the law, as well as of the fact.”59
Although
acknowledging that jurors had the power to decide the law
because they issued general verdicts, Justice Story said, “It is the
duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the
duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court.
This is the right of every citizen; and it is his only protection.”60
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sparf v. United States61
signaled the death knell of the jury’s right to determine the law
at the federal level.
Two individuals were charged with
committing murder on the high seas and sentenced to death.62
They challenged an instruction that said in part:
You are the exclusive judges of the fact. No matter what
assumption may appear during the course of the trial in any
ruling of mine, or what may appear in any one of these
instructions, you are to take this case and consider it, and
remember you are the tribunal to which the law has referred
the case, and whose judgment the law wants on the case.63

Both the majority and dissent thoroughly canvassed the
history of allowing juries to interpret the law to support their
positions. The majority questioned whether Justice Jay had
really instructed the jury in Brailsford that it did not have to
accept the Court’s view of the law64 and cited cases where judges
told juries to apply the law as provided by the court.65 Several of
these cases came from state courts.66 Justice Gray’s dissent took
58

Id. at 909.
24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545).
60
Id.
61
156 U.S. 51 (1895).
62
Id. at 52.
63
Id. at 61.
64
Id. at 64–65 (citing United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1334 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815)).
65
Id. at 66–69.
66
Id. at 79–87.
59
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the opposite lesson from history. Justice Gray argued that earlier
authorities tended to support giving juries the right to interpret
the law, and that they should have more weight than later ones
because they were more likely to reflect the Constitution’s
original meaning.67 Justice Gray read the history differently,
believing that the original understanding should govern, even if
judges came to believe it was unwise to allow juries to resolve
legal questions.68 Most states came to the same conclusion as
Sparf.69
E.

Indiana, Maryland, and Georgia

Today, just three states—Indiana, Maryland, and Georgia—
recognize juries’ right to interpret the law in their constitutions.70
Georgia has given its provision the narrowest construction. In
Harris v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court observed:
It is the province of the court to construe the law applicable in
the trial of a criminal case, and of the jury to apply the law so
construed to the facts in evidence. While the impaneled jurors

67
See id. at 169 (Gray, J., dissenting) (“But, upon the question of the true
meaning and effect of the constitution of the United States in this respect, opinions
expressed more than a generation after the adoption of the constitution have far less
weight than the almost unanimous voice of earlier and nearly contemporaneous
judicial declarations and practical usage.”).
68
See id.
69
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 910; see also, e.g., People v. Anderson, 44
Cal. 65, 70 (1872) (“In this State, it is so well settled as no longer to be open to
debate, that it is the duty of the jury in a criminal case to take the law from the
Court.”); Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536, 554 (1843) (“And it is the opinion of the court,
that it is inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution that questions of law, and
still less, questions of constitutional law, should be decided by the verdict of the jury,
contrary to the instructions of the court.”); State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 34 (1892) (“We
are thus led to the conclusion that the doctrine that jurors are the judges of the law
in criminal cases is untenable; that it is contrary to the fundamental maxims of the
common law from which it is claimed to take its origin . . . .”).
70
GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ XI (West, Westlaw through 2018 regular and special
legislative sessions) (“In criminal cases, . . . the jury shall be the judges of the law
and the facts.”); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second
Regular and First Special Session of the 120th Special Assembly) (“In all criminal
cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.”);
MD. CONST. art. 23 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Session of the General
Assembly) (“In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as
well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction.”).
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are made absolutely and exclusively judges of the facts in the
case, they are, in this sense only, judges of the law.71

In so doing, it harkened back to a line of defense used at Justice
Chase’s removal trial—namely, that juries could only judge the
law in the sense that they applied the law to the facts in a given
case. The Georgia Court of Appeals confirmed this view as
recently as 2002.72 The Georgia Supreme Court has even gone so
far as to hold that lawyers cannot read provisions of the law to
juries if the trial court has not utilized them in its instructions,
even if the lawyer accurately quoted the law.73
Maryland courts have not been far behind. In In re Petition
for Writ of Prohibition, the state asked for a writ of mandamus to
vacate a trial court’s grant of a motion for a new trial.74 The
issue that arose was whether a trial court weighing the evidence
itself violated Article 23 of the Maryland Constitution. In
holding that it did not, Maryland’s Court of Appeals declared
that “the jury’s right to judge the law is virtually eliminated; the
provision, as we have construed it, basically protects the jury’s
right to judge the facts.”75 There was ample support for that view
in Maryland’s caselaw. In Lewis v. State, for example, a
defendant argued that the trial court erred in telling the jury
that its instructions about the law surrounding the admissibility
of confessions were advisory only.76 Though the court did not set
aside the conviction, it did observe that the “determinations of
the law governing the admissibility of evidence are within the
sole domain of the trial judge.”77 As far back as in 1858, the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a jury could not decide
whether a statute was constitutional.78 Additionally, in one case,
Maryland’s intermediate appellate court held that Article 23 of
the Maryland Constitution entitled a jury to decide whether
entrapment occurred as a matter of law,79 a decision that was
71
Harris v. State, 190 Ga. 258, 263 (1940) (emphasis added) (acknowledging
that Georgia courts had retreated from prior decisions allowing jurors to interpret
the law differently from judges).
72
Whitehead v. State, 258 Ga. App. 271, 276–77 (2002).
73
See Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 569–71 (1985).
74
312 Md. 280, 285 (1988).
75
Id. at 318.
76
285 Md. 705, 724 (1979).
77
Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1963)).
78
Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236, 246 (1858).
79
Byrd v. State, 16 Md. App. 391, 403 (1972) (“It was not, under the
circumstances of this case, for the trial judge to decide as a matter of law that there
was no entrapment.”).
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later overruled.80 Finally, the Maryland Court of Appeals held in
2012 that telling jurors that a court’s instructions on the law
were advisory—which comports with Article 23 of the state’s
constitution—violated a defendant’s federal due process rights.81
Appellate courts in Indiana have sometimes enforced the
state’s constitutional provision, though, even as the rest of the
country stripped from juries the right to interpret the law. In
Steinbarger v. State, the defendant was on trial for burglary.82
The trial court instructed the jury that “[i]f any person previously
convicted of a felony be found having in his possession any
burglar tools or implements with intent to commit the crime of
burglary, such person shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”83 The
Indiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction after observing
that “the jury is the sole judge of both the law and the facts in the
case. The courts may not usurp or infringe this fundamental
right.
The right may not be modified or minimized by
instructions or otherwise.”84 Giving the instruction was therefore
inappropriate.85
The Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the provision’s
vitality—at least to some degree—in Seay v. State.86 Seay sought
collateral relief for his conviction of being a habitual offender,
which followed a dealing-in-drugs conviction.87 In the habitual
offender proceeding, the trial court instructed the jury to judge
only the facts and not the law.88 Seay argued that he was
entitled to have a jury decide whether he was a “habitual
offender” as a matter of law—not just decide whether he had
prior convictions under Indiana’s habitual offender statute.89
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed, writing that “[t]he jury was
judge of both the law and facts as to that issue and it was error to
instruct the jury otherwise.”90
80
Sparks v. State, 91 Md. App. 35, 71 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (“It is our
conclusion that the first of these [three cases], Byrd v. State, was wrongly decided.
We hereby overrule it.”).
81
Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 417 (2012).
82
226 Ind. 598, 603 (1948).
83
Id. at 602.
84
Id. at 603 (collecting cases).
85
Id.
86
698 N.E.2d 732, 733 (Ind. 1998).
87
Id. at 732–33.
88
Id. at 733.
89
Id. at 734.
90
Id. at 737 (finding, however, that there was no fundamental error to justify
relief).
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However, Indiana courts have generally construed the
provision narrowly. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that
the Indiana Consitution, Article 1 § 19, neither applies in the
sentencing context91 nor allows a jury to decide whether a statute
is constitutional.92 Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme Court has
also suggested that appellate decisions are binding on jurors.93
In Beavers, the Indiana Supreme Court openly questioned the
provision’s wisdom.94 To this day, though, Indiana’s pattern jury
instruction says, “[u]nder the Constitution of Indiana you have
the right to determine both the law and the facts.
The
Court’s/my instructions are your best source in determining the
law.”95
II. ANALYSIS
Over the last century, a consensus has developed that state
constitutional provisions such as Maryland’s, Indiana’s, and
Georgia’s are profoundly unwise and have no application in a
modern justice system.96 The president of the Indiana Bar
Association described Article 1 § 19, of the Indiana Constitution
as “ridiculous,” “absurd,” and “comical.”97 In this section, I argue
that such provisions are actually a rational component of a
modern justice system. I arrive at this conclusion because juries
have the least incentive to make political calculations when they
interpret the law of any entity in state justice systems as
currently constituted.
Additionally, their incentives and
structure allow them to check judges and other branches of
government. Furthermore, the fact that they are cumulative
91
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bodies comprised of individuals—usually, twelve—from a broader
range of backgrounds than judges typically come from gives them
advantages over a single trial judge in interpreting the law.
Finally, several practical concerns that jurists and commentators
have raised about allowing juries to interpret the law are not
insurmountable.
A.

The Role of Incentives

Most of us respond to incentives. Research has suggested
that incentives in play affect how doctors treat patients.98 In the
legal profession, there has long been a recognition that attorneys
respond to incentives. For example, with compensation tied to
the billable hour, one author has suggested “there was no
incentive whatsoever to settle cases early” in legal malpractice
claims.99 This suggests lawyers may behave in ways that
increase their bottom line even when the decisions to do so are
not in their clients’ best interests. In criminal cases, the judges
and attorneys both have incentives that may not always be in
line with interpreting the law correctly, or in the best way for
society.
1.

Judges’ Incentives

A motive to keep one’s current employment or move up to a
higher level affects the decisions we make. How we choose
judges or elevate them impacts how they decide cases. States
generally use four methods to pick judges. The first is a direct
partisan election where each party puts forth nominees from
whom voters choose in a general election.100 The second is a
direct nonpartisan election where voters select from candidates
who have not formally affiliated with a political party.101 The
third is some variation of the Missouri Plan. In these states, a
commission presents a list of candidates to the governor from
which she must choose. Judges appointed by the governor are
98
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then subject to periodic retention elections.102 Finally, a few
states follow the federal model where the governor appoints
judges and the legislature gives its advice and consent.103
There are measurable differences in the way judges chosen
under the different systems decide cases. For example, a Reuters
study looking at 2,102 death penalty cases over a fifteen-year
time period found that directly elected state supreme court
justices reversed death sentences in eleven percent of the cases
that came before them.104 In contrast, judges subject to selection
by some variation of the Missouri Plan reversed death sentences
in fifteen percent of cases,105 and appointed judges reversed death
sentences twenty-six percent of the time.106
Judges have an incentive to keep their jobs or to move up to
higher positions. Those subject to elections of some sort therefore
have an incentive to reach politically palatable results so they
can prevail in campaigns. This in turn gives them an incentive
to interpret the law in a way that allows them to reach said
results. In many cases, this means appearing tough on crime.
Judges have several cautionary tales of the fate awaiting them if
they appear too lenient.
One of the most high-profile cases is that of Rose Bird, Chief
Justice of the California Supreme Court. During her years on
the court, Chief Justice Bird voted to vacate sixty-one death
sentences.107 In fact, she never voted to affirm a death sentence
during her career on the court.108 This was a dangerous tack to
take on capital punishment cases given that eighty-three percent
of California voters supported capital punishment in 1985, the
year before she lost her seat on the court.109 At least partly as a
result of her votes, groups opposing her raised more than $5.6
102
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million to campaign against her.110 On Election Day, she lost her
seat by a two-to-one margin.111 Though it received less attention
at the time, two other California Supreme Court justices also lost
their seats, in part due to their perceived hostility to capital
punishment.112 Interestingly, the primary financial contributors
to the campaign were corporations and insurance companies.113
Unless corporations and insurance companies have a special
interest in seeing the death penalty carried out, it seems likely
that they opposed Justice Bird for other reasons and thought
that raising the issue of capital punishment would give their
campaigns greater resonance.
Tennessee Justice Penny White is another example of a
judge losing her seat for an unpopular decision, as seen in State
v. Odom, a murder case where the defendant received the death
penalty.114 On appeal, all five Justices of the Tennessee Supreme
Court agreed that the trial court committed reversible error in
refusing to admit psychological testimony as evidence on the
defendant’s behalf during the sentencing hearing.115 The trial
court refused to admit the evidence because it was hearsay.116
The appeal involved the relatively technical question of whether
a state statute exempting evidence from the normal evidentiary
rules in capital punishment proceedings meant that the trial
court should have admitted the hearsay testimony.117 The part of
the court’s decision that provoked the most popular outrage was
when it addressed the finding that the crime was “heinous,
atrocious, or cruel,” an aggravating factor that would support
imposing the death penalty.118 The court found that defining
“heinous, atrocious, or cruel” as crimes involving “serious
physical abuse” did not give sufficient guidance on when to apply
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the death penalty; instead, the court insisted that “heinous,
atrocious, or cruel” referred to actions “beyond th[ose] necessary
to produce death.”119
It further found that the jury’s
determination that the crime was “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”
was unwarranted on the record as it stood.120 Six weeks before
the 1996 election, a prominent newspaper headline declared
“Court Finds Rape, Murder of Elderly Virgin Not Cruel.”121
Prominent Tennessee politicians seized on the case and
opposed Justice White even though she only signed onto the
opinion and did not actually write it. Perhaps most humorous
was Senator Bill Frist’s about-face. When first asked about her
after he voted on Election Day, he said he heard that she was the
“workhorse of the court.”122 Later that day, he called a press
conference to say he had gone to a library to read her decisions
and found that “she did not share the views of the average
Tennessean.”123 According to Justice White, the library Senator
Frist visited did not carry any copies of the more than 200
decisions she had written as a judge.124 The Tennessee State
Republican Party sent an advertisement to voters saying, “If you
support capital punishment, vote NO on Penny White.”125 She
lost her seat fifty-five percent to forty-five percent.126 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Gary Wade
admitted several years later that his campaign conducted polling
showing that seventy percent of Tennessee voters supported
capital punishment.127 He acknowledged that “[t]hose who were
employed to run the campaign believed that it was important for
this court to have a demonstrated record, or willingness, to
impose the death penalty.”128
Other judges have stated outright that politics affects
judicial decisionmaking. Judge Charles F. Baird of the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals discussed this in the context of Karla
Faye Tucker’s case.
Exercising her statutory and state
119
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constitutional right, Tucker asked the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles to commute her death sentence to life
imprisonment.129 But before Tucker submitted the request, some
members of the board declared publicly that they would reject it;
Tucker then appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
arguing that the board had to accord her petition some level of
due process, which the court rejected.130
Judge Baird
dissented.131 After newspapers reported the decision as well as
Baird’s dissent, Baird’s campaign consultant told him that “[t]his
is the worst thing you could have done for your political
campaign.”132 Discussing another case where a judge granted a
motion to suppress in a capital case, Judge Baird observed,
“[Y]ou get the message very quickly in Texas that if you rule
adverse to the prosecution, it’s going to come back and haunt you.
Perhaps, therefore, it does have an effect on your judicial future
and subsequent judicial decisions.”133 One candidate for a
judgeship in Texas went so far as to promise that if elected, she
would “never, ever vote to reverse a capital murder case.”134
Accordingly, judges responding to the need for popular support
have an incentive to decide legal questions in ways that are
politically popular.
Nor is that the only incentive that might affect how judges
resolve legal questions.
To prevail in elections, judges’
campaigns must raise sufficient funds to allow them to compete.
From 2000 to 2009, state supreme court candidates raised $206.4
million for their campaigns.135 This more than doubled the $83.3
million raised from 1990 to 1999.136 Business groups have been
particularly active. Overall, they are responsible for forty-four
percent of funds given to state supreme court candidates.137 In
2006, they funded ninety percent of “special interest television
advertisements for judicial candidates.”138 Often, businesses
129
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used benign-sounding names such as “Improve Mississippi
PAC.”139 There is evidence that these contributions affect how
judges decide cases. Professors Kang and Shepherd found that
“business groups’ share of total contributions is positively related
to elected judges’ voting for business litigants in all case types.”140
Notably, Professors Kang and Shepherd found that in judges’
final term before mandatory retirement, they were no longer
more likely to favor business litigants.141 This implies that
judges decide cases differently when they do not have to solicit
campaign contributions. While this more immediately relates to
the civil context, it does have implications for criminal cases. It
suggests that judges are incentivized in some cases to make
decisions that will please those who contribute substantially to
their campaigns. If a judge thought a major contributor felt
strongly about, say, capital punishment, that fact could motivate
her behavior in a capital punishment case.
The United States Supreme Court has raised serious
concerns about how campaign contributions affect judicial
behavior. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the West Virginia
Supreme Court had reversed a $50 million judgment against
Massey on claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment,
and tortious interference with existing contractual relations.142
After the jury rendered its verdict, but before the West Virginia
Supreme Court could hear the appeal, an election took place.143
Massey’s chairman Don Blankenship donated the statutory
maximum of $1,000 to Brent Benjamin’s campaign to replace one
of the justices on the court.144 Blankenship donated $2.5 million
to the political organization And For The Sake Of The Kids,
contributions that comprised two-thirds of the total amount given
to the organization.145
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Caperton asked Justice Benjamin to
recuse himself from the case once he won his seat on the court.146
Justice Benjamin denied the motion, finding that there was “no
objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a bias for
or against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the
139
140
141
142
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144
145
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matters which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be
anything but fair and impartial.”147 The West Virginia Supreme
Court reversed the $50 million verdict; Justice Benjamin was in
the majority.148 Caperton moved for a rehearing and asked
Justice Benjamin to recuse himself, which he refused to do.149
The court again reversed the verdict on rehearing.150 The United
States Supreme Court held that due process required Justice
Benjamin to recuse himself.151 It observed that “Blankenship’s
campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence
in placing Justice Benjamin on the case.”152 Even so, the
Supreme Court allowed that “[n]ot every campaign contribution
by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that
requires a judge’s recusal, but this is an exceptional case.”153
Judges themselves have acknowledged the possibility that
having to raise money compromises decisions. Justice Paul E.
Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme Court said that he “never felt so
much like a hooker down by the bus station in any race [he had]
ever been in as [he] did in a judicial race.”154 Those who
contributed, in Justice Pfeifer’s view, “mean to be buying a
vote.”155 Indeed, a study from Ohio found that judges ruled in
favor of their contributors seventy percent of the time.156 And if
Ohio’s experience is indicative of how political contributions
influence judges, it is no answer to say that judges can recuse
themselves when cases involve their campaign contributors.
During a twelve-year study involving 215 cases where a
campaign contributor was a party, judges recused themselves in
only nine.157 Understandably, forty-six percent of state court
judges themselves think that judicial contributions influence at
least some judges’ decisions.158
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All of this suggests an easy solution: appoint judges. The
Reuters study above found that appointed judges were the most
likely to set aside death sentences.159 Because they do not have
to face voters or raise campaign contributions, one might suspect
they have no incentive to decide legal questions in a way that
generates a popular result. The best example of an appointive
model is in the federal court system. In the federal system, a
judge can serve for the rest of her life once nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.160 Several states employ
a variation of this approach. In Maine, the governor appoints
judges subject to confirmation by a legislative committee; the
state senate can then review the appointment.161 In New Jersey,
the governor appoints judges and then the state senate chooses
whether to confirm them.162 After a seven-year term, the
governor can then grant them life tenure.163 Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island join New Jersey in allowing judges
life tenure.164
While appointment may reduce some of the incentives
discussed above, it does not eliminate them. Recall that one of
the aspirations a judge likely holds is to be appointed to a seat on
a higher court. A trial court judge could harbor ambitions to be
appointed to an intermediate appellate court. Similarly, a judge
sitting on an intermediate appellate court could aspire to serve
on the court of last resort. An important way to achieve such
aspirations is to ensure that an appointment would be politically
palatable and that one comes to the attention of those who
appoint judges. A governor is unlikely to appoint a judge who
could be easily pilloried for one reason or the other, even if the
decision for which a nominee would be criticized is the correct
one. That is because such an appointment could deprive the
governor or political party supporting his appointment of political
capital. No governor wants a version of what happened with
Robert Bork to happen to her, where a nomination takes a great
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deal of time and debate, only to be voted down.165 By the same
token, a judge wishing for appointment to a higher court must be
seen favorably by the governor who could appoint her.
Some evidence shows that these incentives skew decisions
for appointed judges.
A study found that judges facing
reappointment by a governor became more likely to support
executive branch and government litigants than those facing
unopposed retention elections and even those facing partisan
reelection campaigns.166 This study has greater implications
than just judicial behavior in states where governors can
reappoint judges. It illustrates a broader point that those who
want to move to a higher court have an incentive to tailor legal
rulings to appeal to those who can appoint them. For example,
say a state trial court judge wanted to be appointed by the
governor to the highest court in the state and a seat was opening
up in the near future. Further, she is put on a prominent
criminal case with a legal question that will determine the
outcome, and she is aware that the governor has been outspoken
about the crime and the legal issue which the case turns on.
Suppose too that the public—by and large—is outraged by the
crime and has its own view about the legal issue. That judge has
an incentive to produce a legal ruling in alignment with the
governor’s views. If the judge does not, the governor may
conclude that the judge does not share her legal views or that she
cannot appoint the judge without inviting popular disapproval.
There is even the possibility that appointed judges have to
consider interest group preferences and a governor’s financial
contributors in determining less salient legal issues. Suppose the
judge knows that the governor has been known to place great
weight on the recommendations of particular interest groups
about candidates for judgeships who have donated substantial
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sums of money to her campaigns or given her important public
support. That judge would be aware that it is advisable for her
legal rulings to be in line with that interest group’s views.
Thus, an appointive model does not eliminate the incentive
to interpret the law in a results-driven way for judges that desire
reappointment or an appointment to a higher court. Sure, a trial
court judge given life tenure who intends only to serve on the
trial court would not have an incentive to tailor her legal rulings
to public opinion or the views of those who could appoint her. In
fact, Professor Shepherd’s study indicates that retiring judges
became no more likely to vote for government litigants in their
last terms before retiring.167 However, the same logic means that
a judge elected to a trial court who intends to serve only one term
there has no incentive to engage in results-driven jurisprudence.
The determinant for whether the perverse incentives described
above come into play is whether the judge has ambitions of
serving multiple terms or serving on a higher court.
Under present conditions, state judges’ incentives are often
not aligned with reaching the correct or best result on legal
questions. Of course, many if not most judges discharge their
duties admirably and do their best to apply the law impartially.
But a justice system should not ignore the incentives it sets up
for judges to decide cases a certain way. It must remember that
for all their education, experience, and—typical—commitment to
justice, they are human beings like the rest of us.
2.

Attorneys’ Incentives

The other actors in the judicial system that have experience
interpreting the law are the attorneys. Attorneys are officers of
the court whom many view as having a “special duty to the
judicial system.”168 Professional rules define some of these
obligations. For example, lawyers are not supposed to “make a
false statement of fact or law” to a court,169 or “fail to disclose to
the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client
and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”170 Prosecutors even have
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a special responsibility to safeguard the rights of the accused.171
But, under those same model rules, lawyers also have a duty to
zealously advocate for clients.172 And perhaps to a large extent,
their professional reputations and livelihoods depend upon
winning.
For prosecutors, this reality means they have an incentive to
argue for whatever legal interpretation leads to a conviction so
that their conviction rates are as high as possible when they run
for reelection. Notably, all but four states elect prosecutors.173
Further, cases that have received considerable media attention
can often rear their heads in reelection campaigns.174 And
campaigns are also valuable opportunities for prosecutors to
show they are tough on crime.175 To give just one example,
California Attorney General John K. Van de Kamp ran a
television commercial where an announcer stood before a gas
chamber and declared that Van de Kamp “put or kept 277
murderers on Death Row.”176 Conviction rates are discussed in
about forty percent of prosecutorial elections.177 A prosecutor,
knowing that conviction rates and high profile cases will affect
her reelection campaign, has an incentive to argue for whatever
legal interpretation will allow her to win her cases. That
interpretation may or may not be the best one.
Prosecutors have a further incentive to maximize their
conviction rates if they plan to use their prosecutorial experience
as a steppingstone to higher office. Fifty-one members of the
114th Congress had prosecutorial experience.178
Political
operatives have indicated that prosecutors and former
prosecutors are highly prized recruits to run for office. A
171
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campaign consultant who had worked to elect two U.S. attorneys
said, “If I were working for either one of the House campaign
committees, a list of current and former prosecutors in a district
would be the first thing I’d look at when it was time to start
recruiting.”179 Of course, it would not be just any prosecutor
whom political operatives would want; it would be someone who
could portray herself as a successful prosecutor who has a track
record of putting criminals away.
Defense attorneys have an obvious incentive to take a
results-driven approach to arguing what the correct legal
interpretation is. Their job is to help clients avoid prison, or in
some cases, the death penalty. Their duty of zealous advocacy
requires them to argue for whatever legal interpretations will
help achieve that objective. A defense lawyer with conviction
rates that are too high will soon find herself struggling to keep
and attract clients.
So, in the present system, the judges and attorneys have
reputational incentives to promote a results-driven view of the
law even when that view is incorrect. Even more worrisome, in
some cases they have a direct monetary incentive to promote said
interpretations lest they lose their jobs or the chance to win
promotions. There is one party in the judicial system that does
not have such incentives: the jury. Jurors will never stand for
reelection to serve on juries in the future—if the extent to which
many Americans loathe the idea of jury duty is any indication,
most of them would just as soon forego the opportunity. Jurors
need not worry what financial contributors or politicians will
think when rendering their decisions. Jurors neither risk losing
their jobs nor stifle future ambitions if they make unpopular
decisions. As Learned Hand noted, juries ensure that “[t]he
individual can forfeit his liberty - to say nothing of his life - only
at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in no wise
accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at
once separate and melt anonymously in the community from
which they came.”180 True, perhaps enraged members of the
community will find out their names and harass them in
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particularly high-profile cases.181 But judges and lawyers face
that risk too. The difference is that while there could be a
campaign focusing on the judges and lawyers down the road that
could deprive them of their livelihoods, no such thing will happen
to jurors.
The end goal of legal interpretation is to
dispassionately reason towards the best answer free from any
motive not to do so. Jurors’ incentives are currently the best
aligned with behaving that way.
3.

Juries as a Check

At the founding, Americans as far apart as Jefferson and
Hamilton saw the jury’s importance.
The Declaration of
Independence slammed King George III for “depriving us in
many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury.”182 Hamilton noted
that “[t]he friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention,
if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set
upon the trial by jury,” and that “all are satisfied of the utility of
the institution, and of its friendly aspect to liberty.”183 One of the
reasons was that juries could check judges and other branches of
government.184 During debates about the Constitution, many
expressed concern that judges were “‘always ready to protect the
officers of government against the weak and helpless citizen.’”185
They worried that judges were “untrustworthy, . . . exposed to
bribes, . . . fond of power and authority, and . . . the dependent
and subservient creatures of the legislature.”186 Giving the jury
the final word in criminal cases was a way for ordinary citizens
to protect suspects from such judges. In Notes on the State of
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson observed that if a “question relate[s]
to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those in which the
judges may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to decide
both law and fact.”187 Since then, scholars have argued that the
very process of becoming a judge—the need to have connections
to government officials who could put them on the bench and to
181
See, e.g., Diane Dimond, Casey Anthony Jurors Fear Threats After Identities
Revealed Oct. 25, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 23, 2011), https://www.thedailybeast.com/caseyanthony-jurors-fear-threats-after-identities-revealed-oct-25.
182
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
183
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
184
Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 55 (2003).
185
Id. at 56.
186
Id. (ellipses in origninal).
187
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 214 (1787).
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retain their goodwill to stay there or advance—will not reliably
check the government in criminal cases.188 Often, the need for
juries to check judges and the government is used to justify jury
nullification.189 However, the need to check the government and
judges would also justify allowing juries to interpret the law.
After all, it is only after determining what the law means that a
jury could consciously choose nullification.
Moreover, allowing juries to interpret the law can be a useful
way to protect political minorities. Imagine a scenario in which a
political
majority
passes
criminal
laws
that
will
disproportionately hurt a minority. Often though, such statutes
also include some ambiguity. In those cases, judges have the
opportunity to legislate interstitially, depending of course on
whether one thinks that is a judge’s proper role.190 However,
judges in those states will have to behave in ways the political
majority favors to maintain their positions or advance to new
ones. Thus, they would be unlikely to interpret ambiguities to
favor politically unpopular defendants. But juries might. This is
because increasing housing segregation on racial191 and political
lines192 could produce juries in particular areas of a state that
include many members of the political minority. In criminal
cases, the minority will not have enough votes in the legislature
to stop laws that will disproportionately harm them. Nor will
they have the sway to elect judges who will interpret laws to
ameliorate that impact. Therefore, the only opportunity political
minorities may have to interpret the laws that govern them is as
jurors.

188
See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 87 (1998).
189
See United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.), rev’d
on other grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
190
Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The Holmesian Judge in Theory and
Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 33 (1995).
191
See Joseph P. Williams, Segregation’s Legacy, U.S. NEWS: CIVIC REP. (Apr.
20, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-04-20/us-is-stillsegregated-even-after-fair-housing-act;
Robert
J.
McKeever,
Race
and
Representation in the United States: The Constitutional Validity of Majority-Minority
Congressional Districts, 33 J. AM. STUD. 491, 491 (1999).
192
See Clifton B. Parker, Political Affiliation Factors into Choosing Where to
Live, Stanford Expert Says, STAN. NEWS SERV. (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://news.stanford.edu/pr/2015/pr-neighborhoods-partisan-hui-081015.html.
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Ability to Interpret the Law

Another consideration in deciding whether juries should be
able to resolve legal questions is whether they are prepared to
interpret the law given their lack of legal training. Courts have
expressed skepticism. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court
declared that “[t]he statute which makes the jury the judges of
the law and the facts has been often severely criticised by the
profession, and justly so.”193 It admitted that
[i]nstead of resorting to the Legislature to repeal it, the courts
have from time to time qualified it, until finally it has been
rendered absolutely nugatory [because] [n]o honest and
intelligent jury would, upon reflection, say that by their study
and experience they were better qualified to judge of the law
than the court.194

One argument against giving juries the ability to interpret
the law is implicit in the considerable literature showing that
juries currently struggle to understand court instructions. A
study of Washington state jurors found that they had trouble
understanding basic terms in the criminal justice system like
“reasonable doubt” and “intent.”195
Providing pattern
instructions to help jurors understand such terms did not prove
particularly effective. Jurors given general pattern instructions
failed to accurately comprehend the terms 34.7% of the time;
jurors without them failed to accurately comprehend the terms
35.6% of the time.196 In other words, special attention to the
instructions in the study did not move the needle much.
These findings are particularly worrisome in capital
punishment cases. In fact, a study of jurors in thirty-one South
Carolina murder cases found that they frequently misunderstood
the standard of proof necessary for finding aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.197 And about fifty percent thought

193
Juretich v. People, 223 Ill. 484, 490–91 (1906) (affirming denial of a proposed
instruction that read, “[y]ou ought to adopt the opinion of the law held by the court if
you can conscientiously do so, but if you are convinced that the court is in error, then
it is not only your right, but it is your sworn duty, to render a verdict according to
the opinion of the law that you yourself entertain”).
194
Id. at 491.
195
Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions That Jurors
Can Understand, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 203–04 (1984).
196
Id. at 206 (finding that specific pattern instructions only helped jurors
understand the concept of “reasonable doubt”).
197
Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions
in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3, 10–11 (1993).
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that mitigating circumstances had to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt when they only had to be shown by
preponderance of the evidence or to the juror’s satisfaction.198
More than sixty percent of the jurors incorrectly believed that the
jury had to unanimously agree on mitigating circumstances to
vote against the death penalty.199
These are just two studies that reflect a long-held scholarly
consensus that both real and mock jurors struggle to understand
jury instructions and apply the law correctly.200 If jurors cannot
correctly apply the law as explained by the court in many cases,
does it not stand to reason that they would do even worse at
interpreting the law by themselves? No.
Jury instructions are often drafted by lawyers or committees
of lawyers who do not adequately account for the fact that the
jurors applying the instructions are laypeople.201 Instructions
given to jurors tend to have other problems as well. The largest
category of errors in Professors Diamond, Murphy, and Rose’s
study was one of omission.202 That is, the instructions did not tell
jurors about a particular issue, assuming perhaps that if they did
not bring an issue to the jury’s attention, the jury would not
think about it.203 The jury would then proceed to think about the
issue in a way that conflicts with existing law.204 A second
common problem with instructions is structural.205 Instructions
198

Id. at 11.
Id.
200
Shari Seidman Diamond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury
Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1537
(2012).
201
Id. at 1544 (“Committees writing pattern jury instructions have traditionally
turned to the wording of statutes and to case law to decide on the wording of
instructions, but have given little or no attention to communicating meanings to
nonlawyers.”). In fact, the American Bar Association itself has found that “ ‘jury
instructions remain syntactically convoluted, overly formal and abstract, and full of
legalese’ and suggests that communication with the jury often suffers as a result.”
Id. at 1545.
202
Id. at 1558.
203
See id. at 1575 (“The traditional approach is to avoid bringing up an issue
that the jury should not be thinking about, in order to avoid the possibility that the
instructions would introduce an irrelevant topic that would otherwise not enter a
juror’s mind or be discussed during deliberations. This minimalist approach is akin
to the approach taken by the Federal Rules of Evidence in excluding potentially
prejudicial information that may inappropriately influence the jury, such as
subsequent remedial measures.”).
204
Id. at 1580 (discussing how juries considered in civil cases whether a party
had insurance despite the fact that doing so was inappropriate).
205
Id. at 1564–65.
199

30

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1

have several parts, and juries are given little to no guidance on
how they relate to each other.206 The result is that jurors in the
study “frequently spent substantial time struggling with
connections that they should not have made and trying to
reconcile what appeared to be inconsistencies that were in fact
interlocking pieces that actually fit together.”207 All of this
suggests that the problem may lie more with jury instructions
themselves and the people writing them than jurors. If this is
true, studies demonstrating jurors’ difficulties to apply jury
instructions do not mean they should not be able to interpret the
law.
In fact, allowing juries to interpret the law may allow them
to understand it better and apply it more faithfully.
In
Professors Diamond, Murphy, and Rose’s study, jurors in civil
cases frequently invoked the phrase “reasonable doubt” even
though the standard of proof in civil cases is preponderance of
the evidence.208 Phrases like “reasonable doubt” would probably
have been readily familiar to jurors from legal television shows.
This suggests that jurors bring preexisting notions about the law
to the deliberation room. A terse jury instruction may not be
enough to move jurors off their old ideas about the law. But if
they could listen to the lawyers make legal arguments, see the
statutes and decisions explaining the relevant standard of proof,
and ask questions, they would acquire more information to
override their prior understanding of the law. So ironically,
giving jurors the ability to interpret the law could lead to them
applying it more accurately.
A second argument is that judges are better able to interpret
the law than juries because of their educational backgrounds and
past experiences. To wit, judges have attended law school209 and

206
Id. at 1598 (“When the court delivers the set of approved instructions, each
part has been vetted for legal accuracy by the judge and the parties, but the set as a
whole typically has been put together like a patchwork quilt with pieces from the
defense, pieces from the plaintiff, and pieces from the judge. The jury receives the
result and then tries to fit the pieces together. Although each instruction may be
intelligible on its own, the jury is given little or no advice on how the pieces should
work together.”).
207
Id. at 1575.
208
Id. at 1562.
209
Cortney E. Lollar, Punitive Compensation, 51 TULSA L. REV. 99, 113 (2015)
(noting that in the federal government system and most states, judges must have a
law degree).
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have usually accumulated practice experience.210 They are older
and more educated than the average American.211 This contrasts
with the state of affairs in the colonies when juries often had the
right to interpret the law. In the eighteenth century, many
judges never received specialized legal training or had practiced
law. Between 1760 and 1774, in fact, nine of the eleven judges
who served on the Massachusetts Superior Court had not even
practiced law before.212 Six of them had no legal training
whatsoever.213 Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson could admit, “I
never presumed to call myself a Lawyer . . . . The most I could
pretend to was when I heard the Law laid on both sides to judge
which was right.”214 Massachusetts was no anomaly. At one
point in New Hampshire, two of the three judges on the superior
court were a clergyman and a doctor.215 From 1814 to 1818, a
blacksmith served on Rhode Island’s Supreme Court.216
Even when judges had legal educations or practice
experience, they did not always have access to a developed body
of law on which to base their rulings. Chancellor Kent observed
of his early service that “[t]here were no reports or state
precedents . . . . We had no law of our own and nobody knew
what [it] was.”217 In eighteenth-century America, it may well
have been unclear that judges were any better positioned to
resolve legal questions.218 Colonists and early Americans looking
at judges would have been well within their rights to conclude
that they were just as able as judges to interpret the law.219 And
if Chancellor Kent’s experience is common, that suggests that if
early Americans had to develop the law themselves—especially
the common law— it even makes sense that jurors as
210
Kevin J. Mitchell, Neither Purse Nor Sword: Lessons Europe Can Learn From
American Courts’ Struggle for Democratic Legitimacy, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
653, 660 n.38 (2007) (alteration in original) (“[Common law judges] attend law school
and then have successful careers either in private practice or in government,
frequently as district attorneys. They are appointed or elected to judicial positions on
the basis of a variety of factors, including success in practice, their reputation among
their fellow lawyers, and political influence. Appointment or election to the bench
comes as a kind of crowning achievement relatively late in life.”).
211
Lollar, supra note 209.
212
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 905.
213
Id.
214
Id. (ellipsis in original).
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 905–06 (ellipsis and alteration in original).
218
Id. at 903–904.
219
Id. at 906.
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representatives of the community would have a voice in shaping
it. Now, however, there is no problem of too little law. Criminal
law has become much more complex than it was at the country’s
founding.220 It would seem at first glance that judges are more
capable of grappling with this landscape than lay juries.
At the outset, the assumption that legal training is required
to have some say in legal questions is not shared by every
modern justice system. Many European systems, for example,
have embraced a lay judge system where judges without legal
training sit in criminal cases alongside professionally trained
judges.221 Lay judges can decide legal as well as factual issues.222
In addition, we must remember that juries are corporate bodies.
That means the relevant question is whether a group of twelve
jurors from different walks of life can cumulatively make legal
determinations as wise as those of a single judge. There are at
least two reasons to think they can.
First, juries come from more diverse backgrounds than
judges do. For example, in state courts, racial minorities—
defined as African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans—
hold only about ten percent of judgeships, despite forming around
thirty percent of the country’s population.223 There is evidence
that juries have a greater proportion of women on them
compared to the proportion of female judges.224 Moreover, juries
220
See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph Over
Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657, 662 (2011); Eugene R. Milhizer,
Justification and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought To
Be, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 725, 729 (2004); Wesley M. Oliver, Charles Lindbergh,
Caryl Chessman, and the Exception Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (2015) (observing that “the
number of crimes on the books has dramatically increased from the relatively small
number of crimes punished at common law”).
221
Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi , Exploring Lay Participation in Legal DecisionMaking: Lessons from Mixed Tribunals, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 429, 432 (2007).
222
Bernard Michael Ortwein II, The Swedish Legal System: An Introduction,
406 IND. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 405, 421 (2003) (discussing Sweden’s justice
system).
223
Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An
Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1126
(2009).
224
Sital Kalantry, Women in Robes: Judges, Gender, and Justice, AM. Q.,
http://americasquarterly.org/women-in-robes (last visited May 25, 2019) (noting that
about thirty-three percent of federal and state judges are women); Ann M. Eisenberg
et al., If It Walks Like Systematic Exclusion and Quacks Like Systematic Exclusion:
Follow-Up on Removal of Women and African-Americans in Jury Selection in South
Carolina Capital Cases, 1997–2014, 68 S.C. L. REV. 373, 386 (2017) (noting that
women comprised 51.4% of jurors in South Carolina death penalty cases).
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are more likely to consider the perspectives of Americans from
different economic positions. Judges in state appellate courts
make more than double the amount of money the average
American does.225 Judges themselves have recognized that their
privilege could skew their legal interpretations. In United States
v. Kras, a litigant sought bankruptcy without paying the required
fees, arguing that he could not afford to.226 The Supreme Court
disagreed.227 The required fees, broken into installments, were
“less than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a
pack or two of cigarettes” and should have been within the
petitioner’s “able-bodied reach.”228 In dissent, Justice Marshall
asserted that “[i]t may be easy for some people to think that
weekly savings of less than $2 are no burden. But no one who
has had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how
close to the margin of survival many of them are.”229 He went on
to remind the majority that “[t]he desperately poor almost never
go to see a movie, which the majority seems to believe is an
almost weekly activity.”230
Judge Kozinski has argued that this bias affects how courts
apply the Fourth Amendment in criminal cases. In United States
v. Pineda–Moreno, the police came onto a suspect’s driveway to
place a global positioning system (“GPS”) on his car.231
Dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc,
Judge Kozinski argued:
The very rich will still be able to protect their privacy with the
aid of electric gates, tall fences, security booths, remote
cameras, motion sensors and roving patrols, but the vast
majority of the 60 million people living in the Ninth Circuit will
see their privacy materially diminished by the panel’s ruling.232

He lamented that “there’s one kind of diversity that doesn’t exist:
No truly poor people are appointed as federal judges, or as state
judges for that matter. Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or
sex, are selected from the class of people who don’t live in trailers
225
Michelle Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 137, 142 (2013).
226
409 U.S. 434, 435–37 (1973).
227
Id. at 450.
228
Id. at 449.
229
Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
230
Id.
231
617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
232
Id. at 1123.
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or urban ghettos.”233 If Justice Marshall and Judge Kozinski are
correct, the socioeconomic skew of the judiciary influences the
way it interprets the law. A jury that includes individuals from
different economic strata could very well be more likely to ensure
that interpretations of the law do not favor the wealthy or
disadvantage the poor.
Second, juries at the trial level can deliberate. The ability to
confer and discuss what they have learned at trial gives jurors
the opportunity “to combine knowledge, compare and debate
different understandings of the evidence, and correct one
another’s errors.”234
This group deliberation “(except in
extraordinarily one-sided cases) forces people to realize that
there are different ways of interpreting the same facts.”235 Trial
court judges do not have this luxury. Imagine a scenario where a
juror has an erroneous reading of the law, or one that is
impractical or unwise. There are eleven other individuals who
can explain why that view is incorrect. There are eleven other
individuals who can predict what consequences a certain legal
interpretation would have in future cases.236 The fact that those
jurors come from so many different walks of life means that they
are more likely to consider how a particular interpretation would
affect everyone in society. Now imagine a trial court judge who
has an erroneous reading of the law, or one that is impractical or
unwise. Sitting alone in chambers, there is no one to discuss her
interpretation, or explain why it is wrong.237 The fact that she

233
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Nicole L. Waters & Valerie P. Hans, A Jury of One: Opinion Formation,
Conformity, and Dissent on Juries, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 513, 516 (2009).
235
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 206 (1989).
236
But see id. at 223 (“Unfortunately, the jurors’ understanding of the law was
substantially inferior to their understanding of the facts and issues. Much of the
jurors’ discussion of the law revolved around phrases they were likely to have known
before they heard the judge’s instructions.”). This study would seem to indicate that
even when given the chance to deliberate, juries are unable to accurately interpret
the law. However, the study went on to observe that “[t]here is no a priori reason to
believe that the jurors’ misunderstanding of the law is a function of their mental
capacities. It seems more plausible that the system is set up to promote
misunderstanding.” Id. at 224. As I argue above, juries’ inability to accurately apply
jury instructions may tell us more about the instructions themselves, than about
juries’ ability to understand the underlying law.
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At the federal level, district court judges have clerks who could potentially
push back on an erroneous view of the law, but many state trial court judges do not
have dedicated law clerks. See generally NALP’s Judicial Clerkship Section: Insight
and Inside Information for Select State Court Clerkships, (last accessed May 21,
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necessarily has one set of life experiences may preclude her from
seeing the ramifications of her ruling for people from different
backgrounds. Allowing juries to interpret the law has the
potential to recreate the dynamic at courts of appeals, where
multiple judges can run ideas by each other and forge a
consensus about the best way to interpret the law.
These advantages may still not outweigh judges’ legal
experience and education. However, we must remember that
ability to interpret the law is not the sole consideration. Having
the right set of incentives in place is critical. If juries are less
able to interpret the law correctly than judges, but better
incentivized to do so, it could still be a rational choice for
Indiana, Maryland, and Georgia to give juries the final call on
legal questions.
C.

Practical Concerns

Courts and commentators have raised practical concerns
about allowing juries to interpret the law in criminal cases. The
fact that allowing juries this power would change the status quo
presents others. These are that allowing juries to interpret the
law will: (1) lead to inconsistent application of the law;
(2) undermine separation of powers; (3) make it difficult to even
know how juries have interpreted the law; and (4) be too
time-consuming.
1.

Inconsistent Application of the Law

It is commonly accepted that two juries could view the same
set of facts differently. Under identical facts, one jury might
convict a defendant while another might acquit her. Judges have
been particularly concerned that allowing juries to interpret the
law could cause the law to mean different things to different
jurors.
The result would be that the law itself will be
unpredictable, which would in turn undermine the rule of law
itself.238
Even if a state court of last resort conclusively
2019), https://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/careers/judicialclerkships/upload/INSIGHT-FOR-SELECT-STATE-CLERKSHIPS-SEPT-2017.pdf.
238
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 69–71 (1895) (“The evident consequences
of this right in juries will be that a law of congress will be in operation in one state,
and not in another. A law to impose taxes will be obeyed in one state, and not in
another, unless force be employed to compel submission. The doing of certain acts
will be held criminal . . . .” (citation omitted)); United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas.
1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545) (“If the jury were at liberty to settle the
law for themselves, the effect would be, not only that the law itself would be most
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established the meaning of a statute or a state constitutional
provision in criminal cases, that ruling would always be subject
to reevaluation and rejection by juries.
True, juries will not always consistently interpret the law.
Of course, the same could be said of judges.239 There is sparse
empirical research on jury legal interpretation, probably in part
because so few jurisdictions now allow it. But the research that
does exist suggests that juries are not as wildly inconsistent as
we might fear. A study of Maryland judges’ perceptions about
jury legal interpretation found that a strong majority of those
judges did not believe that Article 23 of the Maryland
Constitution ever changed a trial’s outcome, or they believed it
only infrequently changed the outcome.240 But let us say for
argument’s sake that juries would be more likely to generate
inconsistent interpretations than judges. That fact alone does
not mean that juries should not be permitted to interpret the
law.
Currently, juries can choose not merely to interpret a statute
or constitutional provision differently from a judge, but also not
follow it at all—a practice some courts have sanctioned.241 Jury
nullification means that juries “refuse[] ‘to apply a law in
situations where strict application of the law would lead to an
unjust or inequitable result.’ ”242 This could mean that a jury
chooses not to convict a defendant when the law requires it do so
in a particular fact pattern, or even that it chooses to convict
someone when the law requires it to acquit in a particular
scenario. The problem is that if a jury nullifies in a particular
uncertain, from the different views, which different juries might take of it; but in
case of error, there would be no remedy or redress by the injured party; for the court
would not have any right to review the law as it had been settled by the jury.”).
239
The Federal Courts of Appeals, for example, have been known to have splits
of authority on criminal issues. Compare United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 513–
14 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress because
the government waived an argument about lack of Fourth Amendment standing),
with United States v. Rodriguez–Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 617 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that “[t]he government cannot waive [the defendant’s] lack of [Fourth Amendment]
standing”).
240
Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Right to Disagree: Judges, Juries, and the
Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 570, 584–85
(1977).
241
E.g., Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920) (“The judge
cannot direct a verdict it is true, and the jury has the power to bring in a verdict in
the teeth of both law and facts.”).
242
Aaron T. Oliver, Jury Nullification: Should the Type of Case Matter?, 6 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 50 (1996).
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case, it is hard to know for certain that that is what happened.243
On the other hand, if juries can interpret the law and provide
some indication of what they understand it to mean, the system
would know exactly why it has chosen to acquit or convict.
Instead of having to wonder whether a jury has nullified, we
would know definitively whether it did. That gives us a better
idea of how consistently the law is currently being applied.
Moreover, allowing juries to interpret the law could lead to more
considered decisions about whether to nullify. Having the
defense and prosecution present arguments to the jury about how
they should interpret the law could give them a greater ability to
know what the law means. It is only when the jury has a firm
grasp on the law’s meaning that they can truly choose to
disregard it. And when they have more context about what the
law is trying to accomplish and how it fits into the larger
criminal justice system gained from hearing such arguments,
they will better understand the implications of nullifying.
Of course, it would give many cold comfort to know exactly
how often the jury incorrectly interprets the law. But, this could
be beneficial. If juries really are misunderstanding the law and
applying it incorrectly, that raises the question of whether the
law is as clear as members of the legal profession might think.
This is a particularly important consideration in criminal cases
where we expect the law to provide clear notice of what conduct
is illegal, even to non-lawyers.244 Juries misinterpreting the law
would send a signal to the legislature and appellate courts that
their statutes and decisions are unclear as presently formulated.
These entities would know that they need to reformulate their
statutes and decisions to provide truly clear notice of what
conduct is criminalized and how statutes and decisions are
supposed to apply. If the law eventually becomes clearer and
easier to understand because of juror mistakes, that is a small
price to pay.
So ironically, giving juries the power to
misinterpret the law could lead to better law.
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Adrien Leavitt, Queering Jury Nullification: Using Jury Nullification as a
Tool to Fight Against the Criminalization of Queer and Transgender People, 10
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 709, 723 (2012) (“As a result of Sparf, jurors are forced to
hide their intention to nullify, making it is [sic] impossible to know precisely when
jury nullification occurs.”).
244
United States v. Genova, 333 F.3d 750, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[P]eople are
entitled to clear notice of what the criminal law forbids.”).
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Lastly, one has to ask what inconsistent jury legal
interpretations would tell us about legal interpretation in the
status quo. If many juries repeatedly interpret, say, a sentencing
statute inconsistently, and differently than judges do, that means
that the court system has imposed uniformity in the absence of
societal consensus on what that statute means. And that raises
serious questions. How many defendants went to prison or death
row based on an interpretation of a statute that society does not
agree on? And is there not something fundamentally unfair
about that?
2.

Separation of Powers

Some courts have suggested that allowing juries to interpret
the law would usurp the judicial branch’s power to “say what the
law is.”245 For example, Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts’s
Supreme Court observed, “It would be alike a usurpation of
authority and violation of duty, for a court, on a jury trial, to
decide authoritatively on the questions of fact, and for the jury to
decide ultimately and authoritatively upon the questions of
law.”246
This argument assumes what it must prove: that judges are
the only proper entity in the legal system to interpret the law.
There appears to have been no consensus that this was true
when the founding fathers drafted the federal Constitution
codifying the principle of separation of powers. If Justice Chase’s
impeachment trial—where one of the charges was that he denied
juries the opportunity to determine questions of law—is any
indication, the original understanding of separation of powers
was arguably that juries deciding legal questions did not infringe
upon it.
3.

How Will We Know How Juries Interpreted the Law?

Traditionally, juries have given general verdicts.247 They
either find a defendant guilty or not guilty. This makes it
difficult to know exactly why they made the decision they did.
Did they give particular emphasis to certain facts and not others?
How did they weigh competing testimony? With a general
verdict, it is not always possible to know, even if we can make
245
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inferences about what the jury must have believed in reaching a
particular result. One objection to allowing juries to resolve legal
questions is that we would not know what legal determinations
they made.
Leaving aside that this problem is inherent to general
verdicts and not to legal determinations specifically, there are
steps the legal system could take to ascertain jurors’ views. One
solution would be a greater emphasis on special verdict forms.
Criminal juries have used special verdicts in many contexts.248
One way to gain insight into what juries interpreted the law to
mean would be to use modified special verdict forms with an
entry for juries to say whether they agreed with the judge’s
interpretation of the law, and if not, a short explanation of what
they understood it to mean.
4.

Allowing Juries to Interpret the Law Will Lengthen Trials

There is a worry that having juries answer technical legal
questions will prolong the trial process, to the detriment of
judicial economy.249 Jurors, because of their lack of legal
training, will take longer than a judge would to interpret a
statute or constitutional provision. This is probably true. But it
is insufficient on its own to prevent juries from interpreting the
law. The “delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice
[resulting from juries], are the price that all free nations must
pay for their liberty.”250 If juries bring important advantages to
the interpretative process that other entities in the justice
system do not, a longer trial seems a fair price to pay for better
adjudication, especially when life and liberty are at stake.
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See United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 85 (4th Cir. 1995) (forfeiture); United
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Jerome, 924 F.2d 170, 173, amended, 942 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1991))); United
States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310, 1317 (7th Cir. 1986) (permitting a special verdict
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Effect on Plea Bargaining

There is a possible advantage I have not yet mentioned:
changing the calculus around plea bargaining. Around ninety to
ninety-five percent of criminal cases end in plea bargains.251 As a
consequence, “[t]he criminal process in the United States has
become largely an administrative one, with the police,
prosecutors, and judges overseeing the criminal laws with little
intervention by the people.”252 For a defendant, the allure is to
receive a more lenient sentence, though scholarship has explored
how plea bargaining has become a coercive process that spurs
innocent people to plead guilty.253 The temptation to plead guilty
is particularly strong if courts have definitively interpreted the
law to mean one thing and the defendant is confident she will be
convicted under that reading. But what if defendants could
argue a contrary view of the law to the jury? Predicting the
outcome at trial could become much harder for both sides. The
result could be that defendants become willing to take their
chances at trial. Enough defendants making that choice could
diminish legislatures’ enthusiasm for expanding the number of
crimes and providing draconian punishments. The Supreme
Court has recognized that “[i]f every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal
Government would need to multiply by many times the number
of judges and court facilities.”254 Legislatures would therefore see
a much higher cost to harsh punishment regimes and have to
weigh whether they are willing to ask citizens to pay higher
taxes to sustain those regimes.
CONCLUSION
Allowing juries to interpret the law comes with undeniable
downsides. One can easily imagine lay jurors struggling to
understand briefs stuffed full of legal jargon or how relevant
statutory provisions fit together. Without previous experience
interpreting the law, they will take longer than a judge would to
get up to speed on the issues. And after all of that, there is a risk
251
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE
BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/
PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf.
252
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they will interpret the law incorrectly or more inconsistently
than judges do. My purpose here is not to deny these concerns.
Rather, it is to demonstrate the virtues of such provisions, which
are more considerable than most members of the legal profession
evidently believe. Juries have important advantages over other
players in the legal system that makes giving them authority to
interpret the law a rational choice even today.
The idea of juries interpreting the law in criminal cases has
rankled the legal profession for a long time. That feeling
explains why all but three states stripped juries of such power,
and why so many would look askance at the state law provisions
of Indiana, Maryland, and Georgia allowing juries to interpret
the law. Far from being antiquated relics, those provisions
remain a reasonable response to the realities of the justice
system in the twenty-first century.

